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Between Utrecht and the War of the Austrian Succession:
The Dutch Translation of the British Merchant of 1728
KOEN STAPELBROEK*
Department of History, University of Helsinki, Finland
Summary
The aim of this article is to shed light on some elements of the context in which the
Dutch translation of the British Merchant of 1728 was published. At first sight the
translation appears to be a straightforward mercantile handbook. No additions are made
to the English language original of 1721, other than a set of tables. Yet, precisely in this
mercantile function lies a different political significance. The argument of this article,
built up through contextual reconstruction and analysis of a number of pamphlets, trade
handbooks and periodicals, is that the Historie van den algemenen en bijzonderen
koophandel van Groot Brittannien provided an instrument to its Dutch readers,
presumably consisting to a large extent of merchants and politicians, for coming to
grips with the reality of international commerce that had emerged following the War of
the Spanish Succession. Understanding, and subsequently being able to react to, the
recent history of British trade and Hanoverian commercial politics had by the 1720s
become a key factor in the development of Dutch trade and of the new outlooks on
international politics that were required to preserve the Republic. The article suggests
that the publisher of the Dutch translation of the British Merchant, a Huguenot from
Delft, along with other Dutch Huguenot publishers tended to translate and publish
specific texts that paved the way for a commercial politics that combined allegiance to
Britain and Austria with a vision of European trade that was of French origin and
contrasted with British principles of foreign trade.
Keywords: Dutch Republic; trade; translation; British Merchant; commercial treaties.
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1. Introduction
The eighteenth-century history of European peace and trade is traditionally recounted—
within different historical sub-disciplines—as a sequence of periods of war and peace.
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Within this narrative, each phase of conflict or settlement has been given a variety of
labels and characteristic qualifications by successive generations of historians in later
times. The Seven Years’ War, for instance, in recent years has come to be known as the
first ‘World War’ and also as the first global trade war. This same war also has been
identified as the point at which the intensity of the translation of economic texts from one
European language into another dramatically increased and at which, one might suggest,
the cumulative adaptation of local knowledge about trade became compounded into a
general internationally spread body of thought with its own language.1
This article focuses on a publication from a few decades before the Seven Years’ War
that cannot be directly associated with a specific instance where warfare or the settling of
conflict itself directly sparked the initiative to translate a specific text. As is well known,
the British Merchant itself was published at various intervals in 1713/14, in the midst of a
heated party political pamphlet debate following the voting down by the House of
Commons of the commercial treaty with France that had been agreed at the end of the
War of the Spanish Succession. Yet, in 1728, the year a Dutch translation appeared, the
only (smaller) conflict that may have provided a similar occasion for translation was
the Anglo-Spanish War of 1727 to 1729, in which the Dutch Republic was not militarily
involved.
More generally, ‘the period between the Peace of Utrecht and the elevation of William
IV in 1747’ has been called ‘the most orphanlike treated and hence also the worst
understood period in the history of the Republic’.2 In a similar way, but with a
characteristic flourish, the main historian of a previous era, H. T. Colenbrander, at the turn
of the twentieth century judged that following battles against Cromwell and Louis XIV,
the most heroic struggle of the Republic in the period following 1713 was against naval
shipworms.3 Whether such damning sarcasm is justified or not, it certainly fits with the
standard narratives of the decline of the Dutch Republic that stem from the later
nineteenth century. Within such narratives the War of the Spanish Succession is
(rightfully, no doubt) understood to have impoverished the Dutch state by increasing its
debts as a consequence of the war effort, without generating new commercial
opportunities. The decline of the United Provinces into a nation of rentiers, then,
according to this narrative, was a combination of a political, military, economic and moral
decline that took place simultaneously (and of which the appearance of the naval
shipworm was an indication—some explained that the teredo navalis was imported
through VOC ships and even saw its appearance as divine punishment, inspiring prayers
for relief in churches of various denominations and synagogues).4
In an attempt to reclaim some of the limelight from these shipworms that have
occupied the national historiography of the Dutch early eighteenth century, the following
argument is designed to indicate some aspects within Dutch publications of the time that
appear significant in the wider European political debate of the period. The aim is to show
1 Sophus A. Reinert, Translating Empire: Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy (Cambridge,
MA, 2011).
2 C. H. Theodoor Bussemaker, ‘Een memorie over de Republiek uit 1728’, Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het
Historisch Genootschap, 30 (1909), 96 (69–197).
3 H. T. Colenbrander, De Patriottentijd: Hoofdzakelijk naar Buitenlandsche Bescheiden, 3 vols (The Hague,
1897), I, 1.
4 Koen Stapelbroek, ‘Dutch Decline as a European Phenomenon’, History of European Ideas, 36 (2010), 139–
52. On the naval shipworms, see José Mouthaan, ‘Het knaegen der wormen aen de paelen der Nederlandze
zeedyken’: reacties op de Teredo navalis in de Nederlandse Republiek vanuit cultuurhistorisch perspectief, 1731–
1735 (Zoetermeer, 2010).
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how, in the absence of revolutionary upheavals and military clamour, different positions
on the regulation of interstate trade that would play out against each other at various
points in the rest of the century developed. The question, put differently, is whether
underneath the interlinked stories of shifts in commercial power and events at the level of
political alliances, a different perspective on the years following the Peace of Utrecht may
be developed to account for how in this ‘tranquil period’5 the fundamental positions on
commercial politics evolved into a form that fit with the logic of ‘jealousy of trade’ in the
later eighteenth century.6
Precisely the indirect character of the motives—whatever these may have been—that
inspired the Dutch translation of 1728 of the British Merchant gives reason for looking
into this text and its surrounding contexts. In fact, the collected issues of the British
Merchant themselves were only published in 1721, and had two more full editions in the
1740s (1743 and 1748) during the War of the Austrian Succession. These very facts point
in the direction that between the Peace of Utrecht and the Seven Years’ War the relevance
of the issues discussed at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession remained constant.
Moreover, it seems from the way in which ideas about commercial treaties circulated that
these issues were considered in this period not merely locally, but as part of European
discussions on the international organisation of trade. For these reasons, it becomes
interesting to look into the Dutch publishing context of the translation of the British
Merchant to see how this particular work fits within the development of Dutch political
economy and its preferred sources and the ways in which it modelled itself upon foreign
texts in the light of actual political events and moral and religious sensibilities.
2. The Historie van den koophandel van Groot Brittannien (1728)
As mentioned above, the various instalments of the original publication of the British
Merchant were not put together, rearranged and supplemented with other texts until 1721
when they were published the form of a multi-volume book. For that occasion Charles
King wrote an introductory text and divided the publication into three volumes, each with
their own dedication. In the 1721 edition, the old texts were not only rearranged but also
appeared under a new guise. The original aims of the publication had been crystal clear
and were straightforwardly polemical. As the last words of the first issue of 7 August
1717 put it:
Let the Mercator endeavour to persuade his Readers that our Commerce was
retriev’d by the late Treaty with France or at least would have been had that Treaty
been made effectual by a Law. The BRITISH MERCHANT shall prove that our
Commerce was preserv’d by not passing that Law.7
5 J. R. de Bruijn, De Admiraliteit van Amsterdam in rustige jaren 1713–1751: regenten en financiën, schepen en
zeevarenden (Amsterdam, 1971). For a basic sketch of the period for Dutch political economy, see Ida Nijenhuis,
‘“Shining Comet, Falling Meteor”: Reflections on the Dutch Republic as a Commercial Power during the Second
Stadholderless Era’, in Anthonie Heinsius and the Dutch Republic 1688–1720: Politics, War, and Finance, edited
by Jan A. F. de Jongste and Augustus J. Veenendaal, Jr. (The Hague, 2002), 115–29.
6 Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective
(Cambridge, MA, 2005).
7 The last sentence of The British Merchant; or, Commerce Preserv’d, Number 1, 7 August 1713, 2. On the
British Merchant and the Mercator, see, Doohwan Ahn, ‘The Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce of 1713: Tory
Trade Politics and the Question of Dutch Decline’, History of European Ideas, 36 (2010), 167–80.
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With the publication in 1721, the original question of what the 1713 Anglo-French
commercial treaty would do for British commerce, as considered through the balances of
trade with Portugal, France and Spain, turned into a wider programmatic question about
the ‘natural Channels’ of ‘the inclinations and Wealth of the People of England’.8 On
this issue it was in the interests of all modern states to cultivate trade. King’s preface
included a lengthy history of trade from antiquity to the present day, which was followed
by a three-page-long quotation from Pierre-Daniel Huet’s Memoirs of the Dutch Trade
in All the States, Empires, and Kingdoms in the World, which had been translated in
English in 1717 and in 1722 would be published in a new edition.9 Huet’s message
when he composed his manuscript in the late seventeenth century, at the request of
Colbert, was that having trade was a decisive factor in modern politics and determined
whether or not a state was capable of defending itself—and that commercial monarchies
like France could and should make trade a fundamental political object. For Huet, and
for the people who quoted and paraphrased the same passages, like Joshua Gee and
William Wood, the original model remained the United Provinces.10 In the case of Huet
at the end of the seventeenth century, right before the establishment of the Conseil de
Commerce, the idea of his work was that France could rival England and thereby protect
itself from being overrun by Britain in Europe, by emulating the Dutch. When Gee
published his The Trade and Navigation of Great Britain Considered in 1729, he already
added that:
But if that Gentleman [i.e., Huet] had lived to our Time he would have seen much
more Reason to have applauded the Skill and Conduct of their own Council of State
and Chamber of Commerce than to have equalled us with the Dutch in the
Regulation of Trade.11
When King inserted his quotation from Huet, it was not followed by a declaration of
admiration or envy of France, or by Huet’s idea that all states should equally develop
trade to create a sustainable form of inter-state competition, but immediately by the
argument, developed over six pages until the end of the preface, that compared with other
states, Britain had a larger potential to become great through trade: ‘I shall next endeavour
to shew that there is no Nation so well qualified to carry on a glorious and advantageous
Commerce as we are’.12
When the Dutch translation of the British Merchant appeared, in two large volumes,
it bore a title that differed from the meaning of the original. The Historie van den
algemenen en bijzonderen koophandel van Groot Brittannien, door alle gewesten van
de waerelt (Delft, 1728) was neither a history in the sense of a conjectural history of
trade culminating in Britain, nor a longer factual history of the development of the
various branches of British trade, but could be read by members of a Dutch audience as
a very specific story about recent events and opinions about the regulation of trade in
8 Charles King, The British Merchant; or, Commerce Preserv’d, 3 vols (London, 1721), I, v.
9 King, The British Merchant, I, xix–xxxi. For the long quotation from Huet, see King, The British Merchant, I,
xxix–xxxiii.
10 Joshua Gee, ‘Conclusion’, in The Trade and Navigation of Great-Britain Considered: Shewing that the Surest
Way for a Nation to Increase in Riches (London, 1729), 7–8. This is also paraphrased in William Wood, A Survey
of Trade: In Four Parts. Together with Considerations on Our Money (London 1722), 62.
11 Gee, ‘Conclusion’, in Trade and Navigation of Great-Britain Considered, 8.
12 King, The British Merchant, I, xxxiii.
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Britain for the purpose of coming to terms with the outcome that these events and
opinions produced.
Comparing the 1721 original and the 1728 Dutch edition, the Dutch edition is a
pretty much complete and faithfully translated text, with three exceptions. One,
immediately after the long quotation from Huet, King’s preface comes to an abrupt
end. In other words, the argument that Britain is, more than other nations, capable of
rising above the other states once its commercial politics are given due attention is cut
short. As to the reason for this brusque editorial intervention, one can only guess at this
stage. Two, the highly political dedications to each of the three volumes (to Sunderland,
Pulteney and Paul Methuen) have been eliminated, along with the list of subscribers.
Should the aim of the translation have been to show the political connections of the
British Merchant’s argument, this would not make sense. Three, at the end of the last
volume, the Dutch edition includes 75 pages with the complete tariff list of duties to be
paid on incoming and outgoing goods according to the 1713 commercial treaty that was
never ratified.
All in all, this Dutch translation fulfils a number of functions that coincide with
the characteristics of a business manual. The Historie van den koophandel van Groot
Brittannien gives information about tariffs, incoming and outgoing trade volumes and the
profitability of trade in certain goods. In general it produces an overview of the way in
which British foreign trade was structured since the earliest years of the eighteenth
century and arguably since the time of the Scheme of Trade that was put forward in 1674
and included in the 1713 periodical that was also produced by a number of the same
people. On a more abstract theoretical level the Historie van den koophandel van Groot
Brittannien explained the determinants of commercial success, in particular the
importance of British policies of discriminating between national markets with a positive
and those that have a negative balance of trade.
3. Liberty and Trade in the Princely City of Delft: Boitet’s Publishing Politics
Other examples of books and pamphlets within the portfolio of the publisher from Delft
who issued the Historie van den koophandel van Groot Brittannien may help us close
in on the (Dutch political) identity of the work. Who was Reinier Boitet?13 Born in the
city of Delft and baptised 19 January 1691 (he died in 1758), Boitet’s family history
insofar as it is known leads back to the city of Orléans. His grandfather and namesake
Reinier Boitet took refuge in the United Provinces and married in 1651 in the village
of Loosduinen, by The Hague. His grandson took up his work as a publisher around
1720 and published his first newspaper, the Delfsche Courant, in 1721. Next to his
Beschryving der Stadt Delft (1729), formal fiscal publications of the city of Delft and
Delfshaven and some popular poetry, Boitet published quite a number of writings that
reveal a certain political profile.
Unsurprisingly, for a Dutch Huguenot serving a specific target audience, Boitet
published a range of quite aggressively anti-Catholic works (the targets of which included
Cardinal Alberoni, the Fourth Article on religion in the Peace of Ryswick, a Jacobite
conspiracy and Scottish rebellion, aspects of the Reformation, and the abuses of the
13 Henri A. Ett, ‘Reinier Boitet en zijn tijd’, in Facetten van Delft: gedenkboek van het Genootschap Delfia
Batavorum 1935–1985, edited by H. L. Houtzager and G. G. Kunze (Amsterdam, 1985), 109–10 (95–112).
Andries Otto Kouwenhoven, ‘Leven en werk van Reinier Boitet’, in Beschryving der Stadt Delft (Alphen aan
den Rijn, 1972), no pages.
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Catholic church in the Southern Provinces of the Republic).14 The anti-Catholic and anti-
Bourbon (and anti-Spanish Habsburg) themes come back in his heroic eulogy of Prince
Eugene of Savoy,15 as well as in his centennial article published in his Hollandsche
Historische Courant in 1748 on the events leading up to the Peace of Münster, in which
Philip II is portrayed as a near anti-Christ figure and directly opposed to the pious Calvinist
William of Orange leading his oppressed nation out of servitude.16 Among other interest in
journals for the Peace of 1648, which ended the Revolt and confirmed Dutch independence,
and that breathed the same spirit, Boitet’s commemorative history was directly copied by
the Nederlandsch Gedenkboek of Europische Mercurius,17 which was a direct source for
Isaäc Le Long, another Huguenot printer whose publications will be discussed below.
The same religious-political aspects play a role in a collection of works on the peace
treaties and diplomatic affairs of the time,18 which included pamphlets like the Slang in
het gras, of 1712, that warned against the fatal consequences of a separate peace with
France and the Lettre a un ami a la Haye, touchant le danger où se trouveroit l’Europe, et
principalement la Grande-Bretagne, en cas que la quadruple alliance n’eût point de
succès. The message of the latter pamphlet was the same as the one of a poem which
Boitet published in 1718 in support of Cadogan’s efforts to include the Republic in the
Quadruple alliance.19 Boitet also published poems by the Rotterdam writer Jacob Zeeus,
who towards the end of the War of the Spanish Succession was one of the public voices
that warned against the Dutch war effort not being rewarded by the British ally, which had
come under Tory ‘Papal’ rule, but that the Dutch would instead be sold short by their
deceiving ally in the course of the peace negotiations.20
Furthermore, some of his publications reveal a notable allegiance to the House of
Orange and his observations on the 1748 land-tax uproar in the Northern Provinces and
in Amsterdam show his conciliatory attitude towards domestic faction politics.21 His
readership would have been interested in and sympathetic to British Whig politics
14 Copie van een authentique brief, geschreven door vader Patrik Graham aan vader Benedictus Yorke (Delft,
1735); Historisch Verhaal Van De Werreld-vermaarde Noodlottige Clausul In Het Vierde Artikel Van De
Ryswyksche Vrede (Delft, 1737); Ontwerp van den kardinaal Alberoni, om het Turksche ryk onder de
gehoorzaamheit van de Christen mogentheden te brengen (Delft, 1736); Veit Ludwig von Seckendorf, Uitvoerige
en onpartydige historie der Reformatie door Dr. Martin Luther en andere voortreflyke mannen, 3 vols (Delft,
1728–1730); Kort verhael van de stoute indringinge, het geduurig verblyf en onbeschaemde stoutigheden van de
roomsche priesters, in de baronnie en stad van Zevenbergen (Delft, 1726); ‘t Rapport van de geheime committé
door het Huis der Gemeenten van het Parlement van Groot-Britannien aangestelt, tot het examineeren van
Kristoffel Layer, advocaat, en berucht deelgenoot in het verraad, nu onlangs tot London ontdekt (Delft, 1723).
15 Het leven en daden van den wereldberoemden krygsheld prins Eugenius van Savoje (Delft, 1738).
16 Hollandsche Historische Courant, 30 January 1748.
17 The Nederlandsch Gedenkboek of Europische Mercurius had its own political leanings; J. W. Koopmans, ‘De
Europische Mercurius getypeerd (1690–1756)’, Groniek. Historisch tijdschrift, 33 (2000), 360–73 (365)
mentions its hate of ‘poisonous’ Tories.
18 Naauwkeurig verhael van de handelingen, gehouden inde hooven van Europa (Delft, 1719).
19 Hubert Korneliszoon Poot, Het nut van den Vrede. Aen zyne Excellentie Willem, Graeve van Kadogan, enz.
enz. Gezant zyner Majesteit van Groot Britanje, Vrankryk en Yrlant, by de Hooge Mogende Staten der
vereenigde Nederlanden (Delft, 1718).
20 Jacob Zeeus, Gedichten van Jacob Zeeus (Delft, 1721). Zeeus’s political poems can be found in Jacob Zeeus,
Gedichten, rakende de tegenwoordige toestand van zaken (Rotterdam, 1712); Jacob Zeeus, Vervolg van de
Nederduitse keurdigten byj eeen verzameld door de Liefhebberen der Oude Hollandse Vryheit (Rotterdam, 1717).
21 Korte schets der tegenwoordige beroerten in de Vereenigde Nederlanden, over het afschaffen der pachteryen,
voornaamlyk in de provincien van Groningen, Vriesland, Holland en Utrecht (Delft, 1748);Historische beschryving;
of onzydig relaas, van het algemeen misnoegen der burgeren van Amsterdam (Delft, 1748); Missive van […] den
Heere Prince van Orange en Nassau, enz. enz. enz., aan de Staten van Zeeland (Delft, 1747); Johan Ludwig
Winckel, Nassausche lof- en dank-offer, wegens de verheffing van. Willem Carel Henrik Friso, prins van Oranje tot
de hooge waardigheid van stadhouder, kapitein- en admiraal-generaal der Vereenigde Nederlanden (Delft, 1748).
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associated with Walpole from the time after the ‘Whig Schism’22 and in these same years
have been highly critical of modern public finance and credit: Boitet translated Cato’s
Letters under the title Brieven door een voornaam Lord en lid van het Parlement van
Groot-Britanjen, op den naem van Cato geschreven: behelzende, een levendig tafereel
van het gedrag der gewezene bewindhebbers van de Zuid-Zee-Kompagnie (1722).23 In the
same category, Boitet also sold the satirical De groote gilde der heedendaagsche
financiers (1748). Interestingly, as a possible counterpoint to schemes in which public
finance and trade institutions were joined to float the national economy and the state debt,
Boitet also published Pierre-Daniel Huet’s Histoire du commerce et de la navigation des
anciens, which was translated as Historie van den Koophandel en zeevaart der aloude
volkeren (1722).
4. Le Long and Dutch Huguenot Printers: A Political-Commercial
Mini-Prosopography
Boitet was only one of a number of Dutch publicists of Huguenot descent. Another major
figure in the Dutch printing world of the early eighteenth century was Isaäc Le Long, who
was born in Frankfurt am Main in 1683 (he died in 1762 in Hanau) and who lived and
published in Amsterdam from 1714 to 1744.24 His main work first appeared in 1714,
entitled De Koophandel van Amsterdam, Naar alle gewesten des Weerelds and was a
reworked version of Jacques le Moine de l’Espine’s commercial manual that was first
published in 1694 and reprinted in 1704. The various updated editions of the Koophandel
van Amsterdam of the early eighteenth century (1715, 1719, 1724, 1727, 1734, 1744)
included commentaries on the political circumstances of the time, echoing news
periodicals and pamphlets published in the Republic.25
Among Le Long’s portfolio of printed works was another work by Huet that did not
concern trade, but biblical antiquarianism. The seventh edition of the Traitté de la
situation du paradis terrestre, published in French by Jean Anisson, was rendered in
Dutch as Verhandelinge van de Gelegenheid des Aardschen Paradijs (1715). Huet’s
commercial ideas, however, entered Le Long’s publishing projects through the
Koophandel van Amsterdam (either directly or through the Traité général du commerce,
first published in 1700 in Amsterdam by Samuel Ricard, another Huguenot)—just like,
vice versa, traces of the first edition of De Koophandel van Amsterdam of 1694 can be
found in Huet’s text.26
22 Abel Boyer, Het leven en de regering van Anna Koningin van Engeland (Delft, 1736); Het publiek en privaat
leeven van den ridder Robert Walpole (Delft, 1742).
23 The subtitle of the translation of Cato’s Letters referred to the well-known collection of prints on the 1720
financial crises that was published as Het groote Tafereel der Dwaasheid [known in English as The Great Mirror
of Folly]. One of the contributors to the Tafereel was the Huguenot Bernard Picart, on whom, see Lynn Hunt,
Margaret C. Jacob, and Wijnand Mijnhardt. The Book That Changed Europe: Picart and Bernard’s ‘Religious
Ceremonies of the World’ (Cambridge, MA, 2010).
24 On Le long, see H.F. Wijnman, ‘Isaac Le Long’ Nieuw Nederlandsch biografisch woordenboek, edited by
P. C. Molhuysen and P. J. Blok (Leiden, 1930), VIII, 1023–28 10 vols. published 1911–1937; C. C. de Bruin,
‘Isaäc Le Long (1683–1762)’, in Boeken verzamelen. Opstellen aangeboden aan Mr J.R. de Groot bij zijn
afscheid als bibliothecaris der Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden, edited by J. A. A. M. Biemans (Leiden, 1983), 66–88.
25 See Lucas Jansen, ‘De koophandel van Amsterdam’: een critische studie over het koopmanshandboek van
Jacques Le Moine de l’Espine en Isaac Le Long (Amsterdam, 1946). From 1727 the gradually growing work
consisted of two volumes. Later editions were printed until the tenth edition of 1801/2; see the table in Jansen,
‘De koophandel van Amsterdam’, 5.
26 Jansen, ‘De koophandel van Amsterdam’, 33–34.
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This was not a particularly special feature of Le Long’s work. Huet’s history of
commerce was also engaged with by Jacques Savary des Brûlons in his Dictionnaire
universel de commerce, which was adapted into English by Malachy Postlethwayt in 1751
as The Universal Dictionary of Trade and Commerce and in its third edition was
dedicated to Theodore Janssen, one of the figures behind the original publication of the
British Merchant in 1713. Just like the Dictionnaire universel de commerce was an update
of the programmatic and political project that had given rise to Le parfait négociant,
which had been published by Jacques Savary senior since 1675 (and of which parts had
been copied into Le Long’s Koophandel van Amsterdam), so Postlethwayt addressed
Janssen by declaring that the plan of the work he presented was based ‘upon Principles no
Way incompatible with those you have always espoused’.27
In a similar way to how French and British writers incorporated Huet’s narrative
account of the history of commerce into their own projects, Le Long implicitly adapted
Huet’s and others’ outlooks onto the politicised reality of commercial competition
between states in the late seventeenth century to an early eighteenth-century Dutch
perspective. Whereas the earlier editions were more strictly focused on giving technical-
professional mercantile information, in the edition of the work of 1727, when a second
volume was added with updates on all the chapters that were included in the first volume,
a number of pamphlets concerning Dutch trade with other states and the developments of
French and British trade politics were included.28 Next to the aim of giving new
information, the aspect of ‘political instruction’ became more prominent. In this sense, the
book in 1727 became more like the British Merchant, which would be published in Dutch
in the following year.
Drawing heavily upon Dutch periodicals (notably the Europische Mercurius) and
pamphlet debates since the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, Le Long
commented on the demise of the South Sea Company, John Law’s Mississippi Scheme,29
the events surrounding the Company of Ostend, the introduction of the new Tariff of 1725
in the United Provinces and the political and commercial dimensions of the British
ownership of the Asiento. While the English nation had managed to come to a near
perfection of its arrangements of trade and manufacturing through tariff protection and
prohibitions on imports and consumption, it had made an error, for which Le Long held
the ‘Court party’ responsible, to shift the state debt to the South Sea Company. Likewise,
Le Long accused the British Tory government at the end of the War of the Spanish
Succession of leaving the alliance ‘in a sinister way’ to close a very profitable deal with
Spain and France30. In a similar way, the negotiations between France and England in
1712 which considered the exclusion of all other states from trade with Spain and the
Spanish Americas were held up as a model—in 1727—of how France, with reference to
the aforementioned Bourbon-Catholic ‘snake in the grass’, continued to pose a threat of
‘Universal monarchy’ also in modern commercial times in which a unity of Franco-
Spanish commerce would destroy the balance of power.31
27 Malachy Postlethwayt, The Universal Dictionary of Trade and Commerce (London, 1763), i; Malachy
Postlethwayt, A Dissertation on the Plan, Use, and Importance, of the Universal Dictionary of Trade and
Commerce; Translated from the French (London, 1749).
28 Le Long copied some parts from J. P. Ricard’s French enlarged edition of his own work that had appeared in
1722, which inspired Jansen to think—quite reasonably—that publishing competition between Ricard and Le
Long was the motive for adding a second volume; see Jansen, ‘De koophandel van Amsterdam’, 110–12.
29 Jansen, ‘De koophandel van Amsterdam’, 133–37, 171–75.
30 Jansen, ‘De koophandel van Amsterdam’, 167.
31 Jansen, ‘De koophandel van Amsterdam’, 180–81.
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In contrast with these political designs by France and by British Tory politicians, Le
Long deemed proper trade divinely blessed, as were the profits of the Dutch East India
Company, while the collapse of the ‘Windhandel’ and John Law’s scheme were equally
divine moral punishments.32 Here, there is a parallel with Boitet that extends along the
range of Le Long’s publishing policies. Le Long supported the idea that there was a Dutch
‘right’ to forbid the Company of Ostend and he promoted its joint Anglo-Dutch
destruction.33 He also attacked the designs of Cardinal Alberoni, treated the Polish
Succession as expected,34 reflected on the history of Protestantism and from the 1730s
onwards advocated the rights of the Herrnhutters.35 All in all, Le Long comes out as a
pretty standard defender of the Protestant alliance and the advantages of trade that reside
in having Britain as a ‘natural ally’ against the always profoundly distrustful French.
Roughly this same range of publications was covered by the Hague publisher
Guillaume de Voys, who originally published the already mentioned Lettre a un ami a la
Haye, touchant le danger où se trouveroit l’Europe, et principalement la Grande-
Bretagne, en cas que la quadruple alliance n’eût point de succès (1718). De Voys
published William Temple’s letters from The Hague in French36 and Jean Dumont’s
considerations on the causes of the War of the Spanish Succession,37 as well as on the
subjects of the effective exclusion of Austria by Britain from the peace negotiations in
1713,38 the Anglo-Dutch Barrier treaty,39 Dutch history,40 and the condition of the
Huguenot churches in the Republic.41
Interestingly, when it came to translating political economic treatises, Boitet, Le Long
and other Dutch publicists did not choose English Whig authors like Joshua Gee and
others. Instead, while Boitet published Huet, Le Long was quick to recognise Jean-
François Melon’s Essai politique sur le commerce (1734) as a suitable text in his opinion
and made it appear in Dutch in the following year as Staatkundige toetse van den
koophandel: of Aanwysinge van proefhoudende middelen, om den koophandel op vaste
gronden te ondernemen (1735).
A last aspect of the Huguenot publishing portfolio that seems relevant at this point is
its connections to a culture of religious diversity that occasionally related to freemasonry
(Jean Rousset de Missy, the famous mason took over editorial responsibilities from de
Voys at some point, as did Jacques Basnage) and more generally to a certain moralism
32 Jansen, ‘De koophandel van Amsterdam’, 353–55.
33 Joan Bion, Verhandelinge, daarin ontdekt worden: De rampzaalige gevolgen, die de Engelsche en Hollanders
van de oprechtinge der compagnie van Oostende te vreesen hebben (Amsterdam, 1726).
34 Het aanmerkenswaardige leven en bedryf van Stanislaus Leszinsky, koning van Poolen (Amsterdam, 1738);
Bedenkingen, omtrent De Hooge Geallieerde Partijen van de Poolsche Kroon etc. Opgestelt door O.V.B. en […]
uyt het Hoogd. verlaalt (Amsterdam, 1733).
35 Verklaaringe der Herrnhutsche Broeders etc. In ’t Hoogduytsch bij haar selve opgestelt en in ‘t Nederduytsch
overgeset (Amsterdam, 1738).
36 William Temple, Lettres de monsieur le chevalier Temple, ecrites durant son ambassade à La Haye au comte
d’Arlington, & à M. le chevalier Jean Trèvor secretaires d’etat sous le reg´ne de Charles II (The Hague, 1710).
37 Jean Dumont, Recherche modeste des Causes de la présente guerre. En ce qui concerne les Provinces-Unies
(The Hague, 1703). Dumont was the author of the famous Les Soupirs de L’Europe, etc; Or, The Groans of
Europe at the Prospect of the Present Posture of Affairs (London, 1713, first published in French in 1712).
38 Raisons pourquoi sa majesté imperiale n’a pas concouru a la paix concluë à Utrecht le 11. avril (The
Hague, 1713).
39 Le Traite de la Barrière, conclu et signé a Anvers le 15. Novembre (The Hague, 1715).
40 Jean Jennet, Histoire de la république des Provinces-Unies des Païs-Bas, depuis son établissement jusques à
la mort de Guillaume III, roi de la Grande Bretagne (The Hague, 1704).
41 Apologie du Synode de Nimegue: Pour servir de réponse à la Lettre Circulaire de Mr. de Joncourt aux Eglises
Wallonnes: Par laquelle il demande la Retractation de l’arrêté dudit Synode (The Hague, 1708).
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about politics and economic development. A specific example of the latter is Jean
Dumont’s Recherche modeste des Causes de la présente guerre, En ce qui concerne les
Provinces-Unies, published by de Voys, in which Dumont holds ‘the spirit of Richelieu’
responsible for the breakout of warfare. Regarding the spirit and political ambitions of
Richelieu and his persecution of Protestant Frenchmen which were detrimental to the
French nation, the idea was that the impairment of religious freedom represented a distortion
of French social and economic development that fuelled Louis XIV’s preference of
conquest over commerce. Indeed, it became a major commonplace around 1700, not just
among British and Dutch writers (it was included in Le Long’s Koophandel van Amsterdam
and in the British Merchant) and refugee Huguenots, but also among French deputies to the
Conseil de Commerce, and to writers like Huet, that the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes
had cost the French state dearly and had been a major political economic error vis-à-vis the
French interest.42 Apart from any specific facts about the important roles of Huguenots in
Dutch and British finance and trade, the underlying abstract idea was that to be properly
competitive with Britain and the United Provinces on the basis of reciprocity and pure
exchange, it was the spirit of Richelieu that simultaneously constrained French economic
development and had necessitated the development of a political alliance by other states
against this spirit.43 In line with this perspective, it was also essential that Austria was
included in the alliance and not excluded for narrowly interested political reasons.44
5. Hesitant Hanoverians
The contours of Dutch Huguenot publishing politics hold a certain relevance against the
background of the high diplomacy of the time. Here the dominant question was the Dutch
accession to the Hanoverian treaty and the complex of factors associated with this issue.45
The United Provinces only joined the Hanoverian alliance in 1726 after a stage of
hesitation and deliberation that ended a period following the Triple Alliance of 1717 in
42 Warren C. Scoville, The Persecution of Huguenots and French Economic Development, 1680–1720
(Berkeley, CA, 1960), for example lists Jean Anisson’s lamentations about the state of Lyon’s commerce after
the departure of the Huguenots. See also Laurence Huey Boles, The Huguenots, the Protestant Interest, and the
War of the Spanish Succession, 1702–1714 (New York, NY, 1997); J. F. Bosher, The Canada Merchants, 1713–
1763 (Oxford, 1987). For details on the role of the Huguenots in the London financial community, among many
other works, see the standard John Carswell, The South Sea Bubble (Stanford, CA, 1961).
43 On the general line of argument and moral and political themes involved in literature of Huguenot origin in
the United Provinces and Europe, see the very useful G. C. Gibbs, ‘Some Intellectual and Political Influences of
the Huguenot Emigrés in the United Provinces, c. 1680–1730’, Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de
Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, 90 (1975), 255–87. See also Willem Frijhoff, ‘Uncertain Brotherhood: The
Huguenots in the Dutch Republic’, in Memory and Identity: The Huguenots in France and the Atlantic Diaspora,
edited by Bertrand van Ruymbeke and Randy J. Sparks (Columbia, SC, 2003), 128–71; New Essays on the
Political Thought of the Huguenots of the Refuge, edited by John Christian Laursen (Leiden, 1995); The Berlin
Refuge, 1680–1780: Learning and Science in European Context, edited by Sandra Pott, Sandra Richter, Martin
Mulsow, and Lutz Danneberg (Leiden, 2003).
44 A main argument in support of this position for the annihilation of France with the help of Austria was Jean
Dumont’s Les soupirs de l’Europe, which spread across parts of Europe when its political usefulness was
recognised. Alongside Dumont’s historical works in which the same position was elaborated, Isaac de Larrey—
whose family had left France after the Revocation and whose best known work was Histoire de France sous le
règne de Louis XIV (Rotterdam, 1718)—also developed this argument in his historical-political works. De
Larrey’s grandson Thomas-Isaac De Larrey would be one of the two Dutch envoys to Paris in the late 1740s to
try to get a renewal of the 1713/1739 Franco-Dutch commercial treaty. On De Larrey’s involvement in Dutch
politics through printing, see Gibbs, ‘Some Intellectual and Political Influences’, 277–79.
45 The manner in which accession to the Hanover Treaty and the Ostend trade were intertwined comes across
clearly from French documents in the AE Correspondance politique, Hollande Supplément 10; Mémoires et
Documents Hollande 137 (notably the ‘Projet article separé commerce Pays bas autrichiennes aux indes’).
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which the Republic had not concluded any treaty with Britain. As is well known, in
previous times, particularly under Heinsius, the Republic had been a faithful and automatic
ally to Britain.46 Yet the period after the Peace of Utrecht was marked by a negative
perception of the treaties concluded there in 1713, as we already saw reflected in the 1727
edition of Le Long’s Koophandel van Amsterdam. A prime example of this attitude is the
rather well-known pamphlet entitled Korte schets of 1714, which interpreted the Barrier as
a costly burden on the state and the commercial treaties concluded by Britain as a betrayal
of the Dutch ally and a major threat to the future of Dutch trade and the balance of
power.47 Looking back on the War of the Spanish Succession, the hangover from Utrecht
did not mean that anyone thought there had been a real choice when war broke out.
Despite the existence during most periods in Dutch history of what contemporaries always
understood as a ‘peace party’ and one inclined to war in the interest of the Maritime
powers, the Dutch war effort was widely supported, as the threat posed by Louis XIV had
been too real to ignore and left no space for other options.48 The problem felt after 1713
was also not simply that conducting a joint foreign policy with Britain had resulted in a
huge financial burden for the Dutch state and had produced virtually no advantages for
its trade.49 The political and economic legacy of the Williamite era, more specifically,
was that the Dutch were forced to realise that within the partnership with Britain, they
no longer had a real influence over their ally’s decision-making. The breakdown of
commercial political relations after Utrecht on the Dutch part was the result of broken
expectations about the distribution of the spoils from the War of the Spanish Succession.50
While the mutual disillusion of the maritime powers with each other simultaneous to
the various attempts at shoring up Anglo-French relations lasted from the beginning of the
talks at Utrecht well into the 1720s and is well documented, the standard explanation in
terms of British party politics may be refined just a bit.51 The shift in outlooks onto
ending the war when the Whig government was replaced by a Tory ministry coincide with
judgements of the negotiations held at Geertruydenberg. As Oldmixon put it, ‘the Treaty of
46 For a political character study of the Grand Pensionary, see Augustus J. Veenendaal, Jr., ‘Who is in Charge
Here? Anthonie Heinsius and his Role in Dutch Politics’, in Heinsius and the Dutch Republic, edited by de
Jongste and Veenendaal, Jr., 11–24. See also the well-known caricature, An Epistle from Mr. H–s, p–y of H–d, to
Mr. W–, Concerning his Conduct in the Ensuing P—m—t, Especially with Relation to the Bill of Commerce
(London, 1713).
47 For a discussion of this famous pamphlet, see Koen Stapelbroek, ‘The Emergence of Dutch Neutrality: Trade,
Treaty Politics and the Peace of the Republic’, in War, Trade and Neutrality: Europe and the Mediterranean in
the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, edited by Antonella Alimento (Milan, 2011), 129–45 (134).
48 C. H. Theodoor Bussemaker, ‘De Republiek der Vereenigde Nederlanden in hare staatkundige betrekkingen
gedurende de eerste jaren na den vrede van Utrecht, 1713–1721’, De Gids, 63(3) (1809), 32–88 (48).
49 The instruction to La Baune by Fénelon refers to the British dominance in Spanish and Portuguese trade after
Utrecht, owing to the earlier Methuen Treaty and the newly acquired Asiento, a commercial treaty with Spain
modelled on the 1707 Habsburg treaty of Barcelona and the territorial and trade settlements of Minorca, Gibraltar
and Acadia; see Bussemaker, ‘Een memorie over de Republiek’, 119. Even some of the British were deeply
ambivalent about the way in which their country bargained for these advantages. The Duke of Shrewsbury by
1711 condemned the proceedings as ‘bargaining for ourselves apart and leaving your friends to shift at a general
treaty’; see The Treaties of the War of the Spanish Succession: An Historical and Critical Dictionary, edited by
Linda Frey and Marsha Frey (Westport, CT, 1995), 431.
50 On the Anglo-Dutch commercial political breakdown at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession over the
Asiento, see Lucien Bély, Espions et ambassadeurs au temps de Louis XIV (Paris, 1990), 565–68.
51 Ragnhild Hatton, Diplomatic Relations between Great Britain and the Dutch Republic, 1714–1721 (London,
1950); Hugh Dunthorne, The Maritime Powers 1721–1740: A Study of Anglo-Dutch Relations in the Age of
Walpole (New York, NY, 1986); Douglas Coombs, The Conduct of the Dutch: British Opinion and the Dutch
Alliance during the War of the Spanish Succession (The Hague, 1958). By way of illustration, Bussemaker
mentions that until 1726, the Brits did do nothing in the Mediterranean to combat Algerian piracy from Gibraltar
targeting Dutch ships; see Bussemaker, ‘Een memorie over de Republiek’, 118.
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Gertruydenberg was in the Hands of Men of Ability and Honour […] whereas the Utrecht
Managers had nothing in View, but the Offices they had usurp’d’.52 David Hume, in
contrast associated the failure of Geertruydenberg with a ‘national spirit’ of ‘imprudent
vehemence’ and ‘passionate ardour’.53 Yet, in line with Hume’s analysis, it was not just
Whig ‘vehemence’ and Dutch loyalty to the British ally, but equally a desire on the part of
Dutch negotiators to prolong the war with a view to extra profits in the coming global
organisation of trade privileges.54 The idea that the Dutch left their traditional political
maxims during the War of the Spanish Succession and only realised afterwards that they had
disowned their proper interest was echoed by the French ambassador Fénelon in 1728.55
Taking this extra aspect of the Dutch disillusion after Utrecht into account makes little
difference when one considers the relation between the accession to the Hanoverian alliance
and the Company of Ostend. It was the city of Amsterdam that pushed within the States of
Holland for the package deal of joint action against Ostend and accession to the Hanoverian
alliance.56 Anglo-Dutch commercial interests and political loyalty thus could still be placed
into the same frame and converted into one another—particularly if they pointed in the same
direction, and if the price was to be paid by Austria. Likewise, the simple mechanics of
political alliance and joint interest could explain why Cadogan’s hard-line Hanoverian
politics did not catch on and the Republic never acceded to the Quadruple Alliance.57
At the same time, there was a sense in which the post-Utrecht reality not only meant
that an alliance with Britain needed to have some commercial advantages attached to be
viable, but furthermore that such a commercial-political alliance had to be in line with the
maxims of the Dutch state that, one now understood, were to be redefined. The sentiment
from the time of the War of Spanish Succession expressed by Defoe that Britain and the
United Provinces were fighting ‘hand in hand against France, against tyranny, against
popery’ and ‘face to face in our trade in all parts of the world’,58 a sentiment echoed by
contemporaries across Europe, had expired by 1713.59 The British principles of
commercial politics had outlived the maxims of the Dutch state as developed in the
seventeenth century60 and the Dutch hopes of buying into British commercial empire by
52 John Oldmixon, The History of England: During the Reigns of King William and Queen Mary, Queen Anne,
King George I (London, 1735), 435–36. Compare with John Oldmixon, Torism and Trade can Never Agree: To
which is Added an Account and Character of the Mercator (London, 1713).
53 David Hume, ‘Of the Balance of Power’ in Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene Miller
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985), 332–341 (338–39). Hont, Jealousy of Trade, 334 uses the term ‘national
amour propre’ in this respect. See also Koen Stapelbroek, ‘“The Long Peace”: Commercial Treaties and the
Principles of Global Trade at the Peace of Utrecht’, forthcoming.
54 Bussemaker, ‘De Republiek der Vereenigde Nederlanden’, 50.
55 Bussemaker, ‘Een memorie over de Republiek’, 107.
56 For details about the jealousy of other towns of Holland versus Amsterdam, where the latter supported the
accession to Hanover because of Ostend, see Dunthorne, The Maritime Powers, 90.
57 A sketch of Cadogan’s diplomatic style can be found in Johan Aalbers, ‘De Republiek en Britse
interventiepolitiek rond 1720’, in Interventies in de internationale politiek, edited by Albert Peter van Goudoever
and Johan Aalbers (Utrecht, 1990), 83–115. For Cadogan’s well-known ‘Relation de l’etat present des affaires en
Hollande’ from 1721, see Hatton, Diplomatic Relations between Britain and the Dutch, 215–24.
58 Daniel Defoe, quoted in Dunthorne, The Maritime Powers, 12.
59 Jerónimo de Uztáriz y Hermiaga (1724), quoted in Dunthorne, The Maritime Powers, 74.
60 Ironically, a series of letters show that when Alexander Stanhope, father of James Stanhope, tried to convince
Heinsius of the importance of keeping up the Anglo-Dutch war effort in the War of the Spanish Succession, he
did so through a combination of threats and references to former Dutch times of the ‘true liberty’ regime of De
Witt; see the Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Anthonie Heinsius, Raadpensionaris van Holland en West-Friesland,
nummer toegang 3.01.19, inventarisnummer 2224. For a discussion of the balancing politics of Johan de Witt
and their further development, see Alice Clare Carter, Neutrality or Commitment: The Evolution of Dutch
Foreign Policy, 1667–1795 (London, 1975).
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dividing the Asiento and the Spanish South-American trade were crushed at the end of the
War of the Spanish Succession.61 No matter what party ruled over Britain, the conclusion
remained that Dutch commercial politics had to be redesigned.
This challenge was central to the years following the Peace of Utrecht, which was a
period of reconstruction of the Dutch state. Apart from the part that had to be
reconstructed, it would remain fine to be nominally involved according to the old
Anglo-Dutch treaties of the seventeenth century against universal monarchy and to defend
the liberties of Europe. Yet, the entire idea of fighting war in the function of the
Republic’s trade no longer fit with the reality of international politics and certainly could
not be part of the Dutch involvement of the Protestant alliance.62 The elements in the
1727 debate in which Defoe and Benjamin Hoadly discussed the reasons for Britain to
engage in war with Spain over its Mediterranean trade strongholds were entirely outside
the scope of the Republic by that time.63
The Dutch concern was to develop a new general idea of commercial politics which
responded to the facts that the national debt had run up to a huge amount owing to the war
efforts, that the trade volumes carried by the merchants of the Republic had reduced and
that its stagnant economy had seen a migration of investments from the domestic
economy to British funds. These conditions called for reforms that could be approached
through developing new forms of trade with other states through commercial treaties,
changing the tariff, or redeveloping the domestic fiscal system. In any case, the political
predicament after Utrecht called for the Republic to sidestep the course it had developed
in the previous century and reinvent the role of its economy within the inter-state trading
system. Various political decisions and appointments made in this period may be
discussed from this angle (for which this is not the place64) and the sequence of economic
reform attempts from 1713 onwards to the end of the Republic (e.g., the 1725 tariff
reform by Slingelandt or the 1751 proposal to turn the Republic into a ‘portofranco’65)
61 Dunthorne sketches the background of such hopes when under Williamite rule Anglo-Dutch commercial and
financial circles had integrated, harnessed by a sort of pseudo-ideology, into a ‘protestant capitalist international’;
see Dunthorne, The Maritime Powers, 13–14. A contemporary like Pollexfen considered Anglo-Dutch trade
almost as domestic commerce in 1697.
62 For a discussion of the futile attempts by Townshend and Cadogan to put the Republic back onto the path of
active foreign politics around 1720, see Aalbers, ‘De Republiek en Britse interventiepolitiek rond 1720’, in
Interventies in de internationale politiek, edited by van Goudoever and Aalbers.
63 Daniel Defoe, De waarschynelykheid van een aanstaanden oorlog, en eenige redenen van de nootzakelykheid
van dien; om den koophandel te bewaaren (1727); Benjamin Hoadly, Onderzoek der redenen op welke het
gedrag van Groot-Britanjen is gegrondt (1727). For context, see Andrew C. Thompson, Britain, Hanover and
the Protestant Interest, 1688–1756 (Woodbridge, 2006); Isaac Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle: The
Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole (Ithaca, NY, 1992). This idea is not incompatible with the practice
maintained by Slingelandt and Dutch states’ party foreign politics in general of exerting diplomatic influence on
the international scene without the use of power; see Johan Aalbers, ‘Het machtsverval van de Republiek der
Verenigde Nederlanden 1713–1741’, in Machtsverval in de internationale context, edited by Johan Aalbers and
Albert Peter van Goudoever (Groningen, 1986), 29–32.
64 But see Johan Aalbers, ‘Factieuze tegenstellingen binnen het college van de ridderschap van Holland na de vrede
van Utrecht’, Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der Nederlanden, 93 (1978), 412–45; Johan
Aalbers, ‘Holland’s Financial Problems (1713–1733) and theWars against Louis XIV’, in Britain and the Netherlands
VI: War and Society. Papers Delivered to the Sixth Anglo-Dutch Historical Conference, edited by A. C. Duke and C.
A. Tamse (The Hague, 1977), 79–93; Johan Aalbers, De Republiek en de vrede van Europa (Groningen, 1980).
65 For context, see Aalbers, De Republiek en de vrede van Europa; Aalbers, ‘Holland’s Financial Problems’, in
Britain and the Netherlands VI, edited by Duke and Tamse. On the 1725 reform, see J. L. F. Engelhard, Het
Generaal-plakkaat Van 31 Juli 1725 (Assen, 1970). On the 1751 ‘Proposal’, see Johannes Hovy, Het voorstel van
1751 tot instelling van een beperkt vrijhavenstelsel in de Republiek. (Propositie tot een gelimiteerd porto-franco)
(Groningen, 1966); Koen Stapelbroek, ‘Dutch Commercial Decline Revisited: The Future of International Trade and
the 1750s Debate about a Limited Free Port’, Annali della Fondazione Feltrinelli, 43 (2009), 227–55.
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can be seen from this perspective. To start with, the political and commercial relations
between France and the Republic from 1713 developed according to this new situation.66
The legacy of Utrecht was still highly sensitive and would remain so for a long time, as
Fénelon warned his successor La Baune in 1728. Certainly the idea that the Republic had
to make a choice between France and Great Britain had to be avoided in conversation. As
the Dutch were notoriously suspicious of French approaches, but equally wary of British
attempts to lure them into a political alliance, such as that had backfired at the end of the
War of the Spanish Succession, La Baune was instructed to operate extremely cautiously
while the Dutch sought to restructure their national trade on the basis of new political
principles.67
6. Dutch Huguenot Political Economy?
There remains the question as to the actual meaning of the publication of the British
Merchant in the United Provinces, or put differently the question of how a Dutch
audience would have received this text in translation. That the Historie van den
koophandel van Groot Brittannien may have been read as a model for the Dutch
Republic seems doubtful. Unlike Britain, the Republic was not a territorial monarchy with
an extensive manufacturing sector and a large trading capacity, but a small merchant
republic with limited manufacturing industry. A trade-based economy would not benefit
from the same kinds of measures that had been successful in Britain. Alternatively, the
legacy of Utrecht made it unlikely that the British Merchant might have been useful for
the purpose of devising the Dutch economy as a satellite economy to Britain’s commercial
empire. Might it be possible then that Dutch Huguenot printers contributed through their
publications to a redevelopment of Dutch commercial republicanism by suggesting a
course of action that took into account the way in which Protestant Whig Britain
competed in international markets? While the Republic was forced to look for a new
understanding of international trade regulation after the War of the Spanish Succession, in
a world in which France and Britain were the main commercial rivals, the moral
component of Huguenot politics could be developed into an economic programme that
stood in some form of contrast with the economic programme that had been adopted by
Huguenot merchants and financiers in England.
As discussed above, the ‘spirit of Richelieu’ was deemed to be not only a cause of the
War of the Spanish Succession but also a factor that had distorted French national
development. Interestingly, French political and commercial writers around 1700 had
embraced the European commonplace that the French attempt at national unification
under a single religion had backfired and had in fact increased the commercial
competitiveness of France’s direct rivals when bitter Huguenot refugees set up shop in
Britain, the United Provinces and German territories. Among other officials who wrote
government memoranda that listed this issue, the Lyon deputy for the Conseil de
Commerce Jean Anisson lamented the Huguenot diaspora and described the ways in
which the local economy had been affected. The was the same Anisson who came from a
Lyon dynasty of printers (later generations would be directors of the Imprimerie
nationale) and who had been ennobled in 1670—and whom we have already encountered
as the publisher of a book by Huet that was translated by Le Long in Dutch. Annisson had
66 For the instructions given to Chateauneuf in August 1713, see Bussemaker, ‘Een memorie over de
Republiek’, 50.
67 Bussemaker, ‘Een memorie over de Republiek’, 138–40.
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political and commercial expertise as a member of the Lyon town council and was sent as
a special envoy to London in 1713 with the deputy on the Conseil de commerce for
Bordeaux, Jean-Baptiste Fénelon (no family of the famous Archbishop Fénelon who
wrote the Télémaque and his nephew and editor, the aforementioned ambassador to the
United Provinces, Gabriel-Jacques Salignac de La Mothe Fénelon) to negotiate the
ratification of the bill of commerce of 1713. There they found among the staunchest
opponents to the treaty of commercial integration with France a number of Huguenots
who had profited from the barriers that had existed since 1664.68
One of the central concepts of the 1713 debate that can also be recognised in the text
of the British Merchant was the notion of reciprocity.69 The British Merchant was a
manifesto for the idea of commercial policy in the ‘Age of Walpole’ that:
A fair Commercial Treaty for England with the French Nation, would have taken
care that the Duties and Customs should have been reciprocal in both Countries,
and such at least as might have made our Exports equal to our Imports from that
Nation; so that a Balance in Money should not be issued out of England to pay for
the Goods and Merchandizes of France.70
This kind of balance-of-trade engineering had been firmly established during the second
half of the seventeenth century and its logic rested on the idea of a balance of payments.71
Whatever the differences between commercial policies by Tory and Whig governments
and proposals coming out of the Board of Trade at various points, this fundamental idea
of reciprocity in terms of ‘consequences’, that did not entail a harmonisation of economic
interests according to more or less ‘free’ price and quality competition, remained a
constant factor.72 This logic was supported and defended by the Huguenot merchant
community of London. From the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes the Huguenots in the
London merchant community were fully invested (literally, that is financially) in the
revolutionary aspects of Williamite Protestant Britain, and were so with Humean
‘vehemence’.73 The same logic, supported by the same social groups also found its way
into Joshua Gee’s (one of the original contributors to the British Merchant) The Trade and
68 On Anisson, see Geneviève Willemetz, Jean Anisson, 1642–1721: un homme d’affaires et de culture au
Grand siècle (Paris, 2004). On Anisson and Fénelon in London, see Thomas J. Schaeper, ‘French and English
Trade after the Treaty of Utrecht: The Missions of Anisson and Fénelon in London, 1713–1714’, British Journal
for Eighteenth-Century Studies, 9 (1986), 1–18. See also Antonella Alimento, ‘Tra vere e false bilance del
commercio: il mercantilismo alla luce del trattato di commercio di Utrecht del 1713 tra Francia e Gran Bretagna’,
Mélanges de l’École française de Rome – Italie et Méditerranée modernes et contemporaines, forthcoming.
69 Reciprocity is the object of a series of French discussions from 1712, collected in the Archives Nationales,
G7, 1697.
70 King, The British Merchant, I, 149; Charles King, Historie van den algemenen en bijzonderen koophandel
van Groot Brittannien, door alle gewesten van de waerelt, 2 vols (Delft, 1728), I, 101.
71 See Antonella Alimento, ‘Commercial Treaties and the Harmonisation of National Interests: The Anglo-
French Case (1667–1713)’, in War, Trade and Neutrality, edited by Alimento, 107–28 (115–18, 126); Margaret
Priestley, ‘Anglo-French Trade and the Unfavourable Balance Controversy 1660–1685’, The Economic History
Review, 4 (1951), 37–52; John V. C. Nye, War, Wine, and Taxes: The Political Economy of Anglo-French Trade
(Princeton, NJ, 2007). For a number of canonical writings in this tradition, see Lars Magnusson, Mercantilism
(London, 1995).
72 As argued by Alimento, ‘Commercial Treaties and the Harmonisation of National Interests’, in War, Trade
and Neutrality, edited by Alimento.
73 Alice Clare Carter, Getting, Spending and Investing in Early Modern Times: Essays on Dutch, English and
Huguenot Economic History (Assen, 1975); Jonathan Israel, ‘General Introduction’, in The Anglo-Dutch
Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and Its World Impact, edited by Jonathan Israel (Cambridge, 1991),
31–43; David Ormrod, The Rise of Commercial Empires: England and the Netherlands in the Age of
Mercantilism, 1650–1770 (Cambridge, 2003), 89–99.
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Navigation of Great-Britain Considered: Shewing that the Surest Way for a Nation to
Increase in Riches, is to Prevent the Importation of Such Foreign Commodities as may be
Rais’d at Home, published in 1729.
Dutch publishers like Boitet and Le Long, however, while solidly in support of the
Protestant alliance with Britain (and with Austria), did not publish British political
economic treatises by Gee, Child or any other writers of which there were plenty to
choose from. Le Long instead translated Jean-François Melon, and Boitet published Huet
in Dutch. What might this mean?
Translating Huet from a Dutch point of view was not merely a self-congratulatory
memory of the past. Indeed, Huet had identified the Dutch discovery of trade during the
Revolt and its audacious deployment in the service of national power, wealth and glory as
a revolution in the history of humankind. Yet, the Dutch rise among the ranks of the great
nations within Huet’s argument served a higher purpose, that of showing that the balance
of power between nations was determined by commerce and that monarchical France and
other territorial states should unreservedly embark on a project of economic development
in such a way that the respective comparative advantages of states would balance each
other out in the inter-state system. Just like the Dutch had been the masters over an early
stage of how this balance that regulated both peace and prosperity could be maintained, so
Europe’s territorial states, once turned commercial, should soon coordinate together a
fully mature version of this dual balance. The Dutch were the historical model for Huet,
while the Brits were the nation to compete with.
The publication of the various editions and translations of Huet’s work only came out
in the early eighteenth century, yet the preparation of the manuscript, ordained by Colbert,
stemmed from the seventeenth century and can be placed alongside a manuscript dated
from 1699 by the French diplomat and ambassador to the United Provinces, François
d’Usson, marquis de Bonrepos (or Bonrepaus).74 Bonrepos told virtually the same story
as Huet, but declared it was ordered by Louis XIV and framed his argument as a manual
for reducing the Dutch trade supremacy over France. While Bonrepos finished his piece
with a few comments on the tariff negotiation following the Peace of Ryswick, Huet’s
manuscript was published in later French language editions, in Amsterdam, under the
original title and ‘augmentée de plusieurs mémoires & du tarif general d’Hollande’.75 So
both Huet and Bonrepos were associated with the creation of a new international regime
of commercial relations in which the Franco-Dutch trade treaties of 1699 and 1713 played
a key instrumental role.
Following the collapse of John Law’s financial scheme and the retreat from the
Hanoverian alliance that under Fleury had influenced French outlooks on trade politics
vis-à-vis Britain, Jean Francois Melon in the early 1730s self-consciously revived
Colbert’s plan for emulating British and Dutch commercial greatness.76 Thus he followed
74 Their placement in the Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères also gives reason to make this
connection: Huet’s text (not attributed to him in the catalogue) is entitled ‘Etat du commerce des hollandois dans
toutes les parties du monde’ and dated 1697; see AAE Mémoires et Documents, Hollande 49. This is followed
by three copies of Bonrepos’s piece, ‘Mémoire concernant le commerce des Hollandois depuis leur
establissement jusques en la présente année 1699’; see AAE Mémoires et Documents, Hollande 50–52.
75 Pierre-Daniel Huet, Memoires sur le commerce des Hollandois, dans tous les Etats et empires du monde
(Amsterdam, 1718).
76 Istvan Hont, ‘The Early Enlightenment Debate on Commerce and Luxury’, in The Cambridge History of
Eighteenth-Century Political Thought, edited by Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler (Cambridge, 2006), 379–418;
Hont, Jealousy of Trade, 30–36.
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in the footsteps of Pierre Daniel Huet and the policy perspective that fit with an
understanding of the history of commerce that started with the Dutch.77
In the opening chapter of his Essai politique sur le commerce (1734), Melon gave an
outline of the principles of commercial exchange and comparative competitiveness
between Europe’s dominant states and their agricultural, manufacturing and trade
capacities. The key idea was that a competitive hegemony could be attained by France
following a reorganisation of international trade relations to be based on a true market
reciprocity, a state that would be reached once the present British attempts at monopolistic
competition had been transcended and French commercial policy had been perfected.78
Melon illustrated his famous distinction between the ‘spirit of commerce’ and the ‘spirit of
conquest’ by referring to ancient history. If only Carthage had properly taken care of its
fortresses, it would have been impervious to Rome’s advances.79 Likewise, if a new regime
of commercial relations could be instated in eighteenth-century Europe, France could be
among the commercial leaders of its time, without any need for or threat of warfare.
Whether or not the selection of texts to be translated by publishers like Le Long and
Boitet was inspired by insights like these, the possibility remains that while the
Huguenots in England in 1674 and before and after were engaged in political lobbies
that culminated in the British Merchant; Or, Commerce Preserv’d, Dutch Huguenot
publishers stood by their adherence to the Protestant alliance, but, taking their cue from
Huet and Melon, redrew the normative lines of international commercial politics to the
ideal of having ‘Carthage preserved’.
7. Conclusion
The publication of the Koophandel fell squarely into the period that the Amsterdam
financier and political writer Isaac de Pinto called that of ‘the long peace’, an era of
prolonged suspension of hostilities in which the benefits of peace for the welfare of
humankind were to contribute to the final and complete dissolution of warfare. As Pinto
concluded, at the outbreak of the War of the American Independence, the third major
military conflict in four decades, this had not worked out and more political-institutional
guidance would be required.
After looking into the Dutch and European contexts surrounding the 1728 translation and
publication in the Republic of the British Merchant, it seems one may conclude that in the
decades preceding theWar of the Austrian Succession the distinctive outlooks onto European
and indeed global trade that were developed during the War of the Spanish Succession were
consolidated in the European political economic mindset. Here they triggered reflections on
the future principles and patterns of foreign trade. Was European political economy to be
conducted on the basis of complementarity, comparative advantages and specialisation? Or
had the history of commerce arrived at a stage where European states were capable of
competing with each other on many different terrains as balanced societies so that even the
Dutch Republic had to yield to this reality and, while continuing to exploit trade as its
primary sector, also actively promote and protect agriculture and manufacturing?What kinds
of intra-European and extra-European dynamics would this give rise to?
77 The Huet-Melon link is also made by Paul Cheney, Revolutionary Commerce: Globalization and the French
Monarchy (Cambridge, MA, 2010), 28–31.
78 Hont, Jealousy of Trade, 30–36; Hont, ‘The Early Enlightenment Debate’, in Cambridge History of
Eighteenth-Century Political Thought, edited by Goldie and Wokler.
79 Jean-François Melon, A Political Essay Upon Commerce (Dublin, 1738), 136–37.
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The development of these questions can be recognised in the contexts that surround the
Dutch translation of the British Merchant and the editorial selections that Huguenot
publishers appear to have been making at the time. In terms of the Dutch predicament, the
main issue was: how did the Dutch in the aftermath of Utrecht understand the prospects of
survival of the Republic’s trade and territorial integrity? The significance of the Koophandel
published by Boitet, even though its likely meaning to its readership is hard to pin down with
any kind of certainty, lies in that it forms an example of responses by Dutch publishers and
printers to the post-Utrecht ‘crisis’ that made it necessary to develop a new way of thinking
politically about trade. On the one hand, Huguenot printers’ editorial choices suggested, the
alliance with Britain could remain fixed, while on the other, it seemed opportune to look for
inspiration in writings of French origin by Huet and Melon for how their principle of
reciprocity as the key to regulating trade relations might work out for the Dutch Republic.
The main analytically salient question for the period following the one treated in this
article is how the various languages and commercial schemes of liberty, protection and
competition that were developed in the early years of the eighteenth century were
operationalised in the following decades. Did they tend towards an opposition between
the reciprocal integration of national European economies that had a global character? Or
did the configuration of the balance of power in the more distant aftermath of Utrecht lean
towards a hierarchical subjection of markets to Europe’s dominant states? These questions
lie at the core of the political and economic thought of Forbonnais and complicate and
problematise the ways in which historiography has opposed simplified (mainly British)
party political outlooks. For this reason it is important to see how Forbonnais viewed the
British Merchant when he translated and also transformed the form and meaning of this
text.80 Not long before Forbonnais did so, in 1743 a Dutch Huguenot writer, called Jean-
Thomas La Fargue, still referred to Huet and to Charles King’s British Merchant on the
same page in the context of a discussion of Dutch neutrality and Franco-Dutch
commercial relations. He did so in response to an anonymous pamphlet allegedly
published by Plumard de Dangeul.81 If the questions that emerged in 1713 had developed,
they clearly had not gone away.
80 See Antonella Alimento, ‘Beyond the Treaty of Utrecht: Véron de Forbonnais’s French Translation of the
British Merchant (1753)’, this issue.
81 J. T. La Fargue, Staats-spiegel voor den Nederlanderen, tegen uitheemsse kunstenaryen en verkeerde
bevattingen des tyds (1743), 132–33.
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